Since 1960, only one new country, Brazil, has succeeded in delivering more than one civil jet per month. Otherwise, all the countries now offering world-class planes were established in aviation by the end of World War I. This being said, low-cost producers within several of the newly emerging markets have already acquired front-end manufacturing expertise as a direct result of industrial offset contracts and/or other forms of technology transfer. In all such cases, government intervention, notably through state ownership, has been predominant, but failures have been numerous in view of the difficulty of aligning ownership structure to financial, managerial, and technological requirements and of garnering the support of domestic interest groups.
Introduction
Over the past decade or so, China has emerged as one of the main -if not the mainlocation for low-end, labor intensive manufacturing in many global production networks.
As the country's income and salary levels increase, especially in coastal zone and selected inland locations, one of the crucial questions facing policy-makers, scholars, managers and competitors is whether the same successful experience can be replicated climbing up the value chain (Nolan 2005) .. While many remain skeptic, 1 some early indicators suggest that this is possible, in particular in transport equipment production. Shipyards which less than ten years ago were still turning out simple container vessels and bulk carriers and had a world market share below 1 per cent now produce 13 per cent of the world's new ships, behind only South Korea and Japan. In 2004, China had a backlog of some 800 ships on order, including for sophisticated liquefied natural-gas carriers to mostly foreign specifications.
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Although labor productivity in the Chinese shipyards lags far behind that in South Korean and Japanese yards, which are about even, China, like Japan, is taking steps to channel much of its trade into Chinese-made ships. 3 As per the car industry, "many feel that it is only a matter of time before vehicles assembled in China make significant inroads in the Japanese market" (Sturgeon and Florida 2004, p. 64) , although growth is likely to be "rapid, but uneven and painful" (Doner et al. 2004, p. 175) . 1 Possibly no coincidence is more telling that the fact that on the same date (8 December 2004) Lenovo acquired IBM's venerable PC business and Chen Jiulin, the once high-flying chief executive of China Aviation Oil (Singapore), was arrested in connection with a $550 million derivatives trading scandal. 2 In December 2003 Shanghai Waigaoqiao Shipbuilding Co. scored an order for two bulk carriers from NYK line, the first major purchase by a Japanese owner, who traditionally have favored domestic producers. Jinling Shipyard has built Ville de Bordeaux, the giant cargo ship that transports the different components for the A380 between Hamburg, Chester, Cadiz, and Saint-Nazaire. Korea's Hyundai Heavy Industries, the world's largest shipbuilding company, has three joint ventures in China, and it already farms out some of its low-technology shipbuilding work to these companies. See "On the crest of a wave", China Economic Review, June 2004 and "Korean Shipbuilders See China's Shadow", The New York Times, 6 January 2005. 3 Hudong-Zhongua Shipbuilding, which is state-owned, wants to become the main supplier of liquefied gas tankers to feed the nine L.N.G. terminals that China plans for 2010.
In this paper the focus is on aircraft manufacturing. In this industry, success depends on design and manufacturing strength, 5 the price and operational costs of the aircraft, and after-sale services provided to customers, that are relatively reduced in number but are spread around the world. Launch and research and development (R&D) costs, as well as survival risk, are high, while cost reductions over time from learning by doing are unusually large. Assembly and system integration are increasingly seen as key competencies for successful primes, as supply chain management and associated risks are pushed down on Tier I and II suppliers. Finally, the weight of history goes heavily against wholly new aircraft market entrants, in all segments. Since 1960, only one such company, Brazil's Embraer, has succeeded in delivering more than one civil jet per month (Goldstein 2002a) . 6 Otherwise, all the countries now offering world-class planes were established in aviation by the end of World War I.
In China, the 863 Program (which included aerospace among the areas that authorities targeted to expand and advance the high-technology base) produced rather meager results, as did some ambitious joint ventures launched in the 1990s. Moreover, the rationalization of the state-owned aerospace industry is still pending. Nonetheless, government considers this a strategic industry, although not an official "pillar" one (Bureau of Export Administration 1999), and sees Chinese companies becoming worldclass producers by 2012, in part via close cooperation with major international aerospace firms and enhanced supplier relationships with non-Chinese primes. China is trying to leverage the interest that foreign manufacturers have in accessing the domestic market to negotiate favorable terms for partnerships of various kinds.
Regional jets, with 50 to 110 seats and a maximum flight range between 900 and 1,700 nautical miles, are seen by the Chinese as the most appropriate entry points into worldclass aircraft production, also in view of the likely explosion in the demand for this class 5 The actual manufacture of an aircraft consists of three principal stages: fabrication of primary parts (metal sheets and plates, parts produced using computerized and non-computerized machines, and prefabricated parts), assembly of major component, and final installation of the aircraft's various operating systems (such as wiring and electronics) into the structure. 6 While Airbus and Bombardier did not exist in their current form in the 1960s, the companies that now comprise them did.
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of planes once the liberalization of civil aviation is completed and carriers are free to adopt the hub-and-spokes network structure. The two key, separate projects in this respect are those that involve, respectively, the national champion and Embraer, associated with a Tier 2 local assembler. In the latter case, this ambitious project is part of a broader strategy aimed at turning China's Northeast from "largest rust belt to fourth economic engine" (Li 2004 ).
This paper provides some evidence and preliminary analysis on a set of interrelated The paper is organized as follows. In the next Section the main features of contemporary aircraft manufacturing are presented. Section 2 sketches the recent history of the Chinese industry. Section 3 turns the attention to the Chinese market for aircraft, regional jets in particular. Sections 4 and 5 present the experience of the two competing projects to, respectively, develop a brand-new Chinese regional jet and assemble a Brazilian one. On the basis of this comparison, Section 6 concludes by linking the themes of corporate capabilities and industrial policy.
Background on contemporary aircraft manufacturing
Aircraft are complex products made of a great variety of sub-components. According to Piore (2004, p. 4) , "the industry has never been able to achieve the kind of standardization common in automobile production (or in pin factories). The production line in airplane 6 assembly is characterized by workmen hammering and stretching the components to get them to fit together. All along the line are boxes of small metal plates known as "shimmies" which are inserted in an ad hoc way to fill spaces left at the joining of parts that are not fully compatible".
As investment needs are huge, uncertainty high, lead times long, and economies of scale and learning in production important, a small number of players dominate the industry. Notwithstanding low standardization, the degree of vertical integration has decreased dramatically over the past 20 to 30 years on account of increased technological obsolescence, higher investment needs, and greater financial market discipline. In a context where the range of possible trajectories, and therefore technological differentiation, is severely constrained (Sutton 1998 ), aircraft manufacturing is moving towards increasing modularization, consolidation, and global outsourcing patterns. Assemblers remain responsible for the design and final assembly of the aircraft's major sections (such as barrel, wings, and engines) into the structure, but fabrication of primary parts (metal sheets and plates, parts produced using computerized and non-computerized machines, and prefabricated parts) and assembly of major components are outsourced to major Tier I partners. This in turn has resulted in the consolidation of the industry for major specialized products (engines, avionics, landing gears, power units) that rely in turn on a myriad of sub-contractors.
A study of the US large civil aircraft industry identified the following as the major competitiveness factors (ITC 2001, quoted in Hartley and Braddon 2002) :
• Low labor costs and the ability to adjust the size of the workforce to increasing capital/labor intensity;
• The availability of government support to subsidize production costs and allow firms to offer lower prices for their aircraft (e.g. low interest loans; launch aid);
• The ability of top tier suppliers to manage their supply chains and improve the efficiency of their supply network.
In order to remain competitive, suppliers and subcontractors need to acquire both intangible resources (managerial skills, reputation, ability to master product and component design, component sourcing, inventory management, testing, packaging, and outbound logistics) and "hard" manufacturing technologies such as computerized numerical control tools (CNC) or automated handling. Co-location is not crucialproduction runs are short, inventory management does not require strict adherence to just-in-time imperatives, and information and communications technologies allow sharing information and managing the supply chain. Nonetheless, for individual companies, networks of firms, and institutions, the learning cycle for acquiring such critical capabilities is rather long, which explains the high degree of persistence of major aerospace clusters such as Seattle, Toulouse, Bristol, and Montreal.
Although there are differences across countries, governments have always played a major role as customers (especially for military aircraft), regulators, and investors. In non-OECD countries, in particular, state ownership, has been predominant and some producers have acquired front-end manufacturing expertise as a direct result of industrial offset contracts and/or other forms of technology transfer (Goldstein 2002b) .
With the exception of Brazil, however, most new comers have failed to gain sufficient competitiveness in view of the difficulty of aligning ownership structure to financial, managerial, and technological requirements and of garnering the support of domestic interest groups.
The Chinese aerospace industry
In the 1980s, China made a determined effort at building an indigenous aerospace capability (Nolan and Zhang 2002, 2003 Each group contains the full range of production and sales of military and civilian aircraft, airborne equipment as well as non-aeronautical products ( Table 1) . 12 The stated goal of the reform was to break up the monopoly and foster fair competition, while also maintaining mechanisms for non-market co-operation. The decision, however, went against trends in the world's aerospace industry towards consolidation (Nolan and Zhang 2002, 2003) . 13 Alternatives existed -such as separating the aerospace from the non-aerospace business, or the civilian from the military business, or engines and avionics from the airframe business -but they were disregarded. On the 10 According to Zhu Yuli, in charge of AVIC until he resigned in 1998, "We cannot accept that we will not have an internationally competitive industry. We were determined to develop a 100-seater aircraft, and failed; as general manager of AVIC, I took this as my lifetime regret. But it is still both possible and necessary to continue" (see "The China Syndrome", Financial Times, 8 January 2000). 11 The other main branches of the national defence industries under COSTIND were also split into two. These include the China National Nuclear Industries General Company, the China National Aerospace Industries General Company, the China National Shipbuilding General Company, and the China National Armaments General Company. 12 For example, AVIC is the largest manufacturer of small cars in China. 13 Not only in the North Atlantic, but also in Asia -Korea Aerospace Industries was formed in 1999 through the merger of the aerospace divisions of Daewoo, Hyundai and Samsung.
contrary, stovepiping -the practice of taking a piece of intelligence or a request that should be pushed through the chain of command and bringing it straight to the highest authority -is rife, curtailing efforts to encourage open communication and effective coordination (Bitzinger 2000) . 14 Workforce reduction has also been very modestaccording to Bitzinger (2005) , "AVIC has downsized by only 10 per cent overall, and this was likely accomplished through attrition, that is, retirement and job-leavers". In . 18 Moreover, work has also been performed to pursue unmanned aircraft technologies both domestically and from foreign partners. 19 China is indeed marketing its drones to friendly nations in Asia and Africa. However, the mainstay of the air force continues to be the 1960s-vintage F-7, Russian staff remains on-site to oversee SU-27 production and ensure quality control, and few opportunities seem to have emerged so far for civil-military integration through sharing of personnel, production processes, and materials (Bitzinger 2000 (Bitzinger , 2004 now account for a very substantial share of paper submissions to the leading journals in the aerospace field. 23 The state of competitiveness Many of the aviation platforms China is now building and deploying still utilize foreign imports for the most crucial subsystems such as propulsion, avionics and fire-control (Medeiros 2004 ). In addition, China still can not produce a turbo-fan engine or advanced fire-control systems for its newest fighters. The only area where AVIC has recorded some success is in international sub-contracts and sub-system joint ventures ( Table 2) .
In this case, cheap labor and big sales prospects outweigh the troubles. 24 
The Chinese market for aircraft
The lure of China is as appealing for aircraft manufacturers as for any other global industry. During the period from 1980 to 1997 air travel increased at a rate of 19.7 per cent annually, which is 3.6 times of the world average. China -and the current reform and consolidation in the airline industry will lay a solid foundation for network rationalization (Findlay and Goldstein 2004 
Finally, regional demand for executive jets in the Far East and Pacific trails the North
American and European markets, but it has strong potential. 
Two competing regional jet projects
In the Asian aviation industry, Korea and Indonesia looked at the regional jet sector in the 1990s, but for different reasons they could not build up the required capabilities consideration. At this stage ACAC is not using composites such as Kevlar and other types of special plastics pioneered in military aircraft in the 1980s.
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The aircraft has two models -the 72-79-seat -700 and the 92-99-seat -900. On paper at least, the ARJ21 outperforms its competitors by using shorter runways, which are not uncommon in Japan and other Asian markets, 47 flying further and offering a roomier cabin and more space between seats. Moreover, CAAC specifically encouraged the use of domestically made aircraft for short regional flights. The company expects to sell about 500 ARJ21 jets in the next 20 years with 300 of them going to Chinese airlines.
The goal is to control half of the regional jet market.
AVIC I subsidiaries are handling much of the manufacturing, applying the Airbus centerof-excellence model. As in the case of the MD-90, the Shanghai facility has taken responsibility for the horizontal stabilizer and final assembly. XAC would build the airplane's wings and some fuselage sections. Chengdu Aircraft, located some 400 miles southwest of Xian, would build the nose section, while Shenyang Aircraft supplies the empennage. 48 Shanghai Aircraft handles final assembly. ACAC sought international cooperation in investment, design, sub-contract production, and technical consultancy.
Boeing has an engineering-consulting contract to help with cockpit design and overall engineering of the new jet. This will create some common features with the 737 model, thereby improving Boeing's chances of selling more of its own airplanes in China.
Foreign risk-sharing partners include General Electric for the CF34-10A engines (already used in the Bombardier and Embraer regional jets), Rockwell Collins for the ProLine 21 avionics system, Hamilton Sundstrand for the electrical system and auxiliary power unit, and Eaton for control panel. Design software comes from Dassault Systemes, the primary flight control system from Parker Hannifin, and the landing gear 46 Customers still find composites difficult to repair, which is why the ARJ21 is almost entirely metal. With composites used extensively in the Airbus A380 and Boeing's 7E7, their maintenance will be firmly established and ACAC probably use them much more extensively. This gives ACAC's suppliers, especially Chengdu, which is the 7E7 composite rudder contractor, time to hone their composites craftsmanship. 47 Hot weather conditions and/or high altitudes (hot and high conditions) mandate either a longer take-off run for a typical aircraft or a reduction in the usual take-off weight (less passengers and/or cargo and/or fuel) of the aircraft. I thanks Peder Andersen for help in clarifying this point. 48 In late 
Harbin Embraer Aircraft Industry (HEAI)
Confident that its broad offering of regional jets and turboprops -from the 30-passenger EMB-120 Brasilia turboprop to the 110-passenger ERJ-195 -Embraer has been busy in Asia since the mid-1990s, considering this market the big plum for its global expansion.
Since 
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receive at least 20 orders a year, it would be difficult for them to be financially viable".
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As mentioned above, the company expects the plant to deliver six planes in 2004, or about half the number it had anticipated. "The speed in which the facts are happening is not the speed that we expected in the very beginning," said Botelho, who estimates the plant will make 10 aircraft in 2005.
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The most accurate reading of the underperformance over the first two years seems to be that Embraer's expectations in terms of a more fluid access to the domestic market have not been fulfilled. Although local production avoids import duties of 24 per cent, these are being cut by WTO agreements come 2006, so the tariff-jumping argument per se is not convincing. As reported above, in the past Embraer had signed several preliminary agreements to sell planes in China, only to fail to convince their customers to sign final accords. The Brazilians thought that the willingness to engage in a not unsubstantial and long-term commitment would give it the edge over competitors like
Bombardier that are still considering whether building a plant in China as well.
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Management also thought that majority ownership of HAIC would prevent the emergence of the programs that had plagued previous joint ventures. 60 Nonethelessdue to the still infant stage of market institutions and capitalist culture, no less than the interest on the part of buyers in extracting as many concessions as possible -doing business in China requires more patience and guanxi (relationship) than in other parts of the world. If Brazilians, coming out of a relationship culture and with less than a Northern European/American sense of time, were surprised by this and ran aground on that particular rock, the Embraer experience seems to fit the general experience of so many firms that thought they had a line on China. Embraer is currently evaluating possibilities for sourcing certain parts from HAIC, in substitution of some imports. Fuselage panels would be the natural next step, but two major pre-conditions must be in place. Embraer wants more sales before contracting that work to Harbin, and the machine tools to do that must be procured first. Location and infrastructure are other important considerations, especially in light of the summer 2004 power shortage.
Conclusions
Which 
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"techno-nationalism" -i.e., the desire to demonstrate or acquire the status of being a technologically advanced country -are seemingly planted.
Nonetheless, industrial policy has far from proven its effectiveness. Progress in creating military/civilian synergies has proven modest -especially when compared to the shipbuilding industry. Government involvement in air transport remains significant despite the gradual shift to a more hands-off approach. Airlines still need approval from the state council and from China Aircraft Supply Corp., a government-owned company that decides on the country's aircraft purchases, to place orders. 63 Decisions on where to buy planes are also intertwined with policy-makers' concerns that China's trade surpluses with the United States and, increasingly, Europe give rise to protectionism.
Other policies, however, act at cross-purpose with the goal of developing manufacturing excellence in regional jets. China still charges flat landing and cabin cleaning charges for all planes and China's Air Traffic Management Bureau lets big planes fly at the level where fuel can be used economically, while the feeder planes are often guided to lower levels where more fuel is consumed. 64 The prospects of setting landing fees and taxes according to the size of aircraft, which would reduce the cost of operating regional jets, remain uncertain. Nonetheless, airport construction fees for regional aircraft have already been cut to CNY 10 (US$ 1.20) from CNHY 50 (US$ 6) per passenger.
65
Possibly the most fundamental issue concerns the decision to launch two competing projects. China's aircraft industry policy combines judicious opening to foreign investors and support for local firms. This may make sense insofar as it allows Chinese firms to build different skills, but the risk is that none of them reaches the level of excellence which is required to become a global competitor. The regional policy dimension, which is so compelling in the case of HAEI, adds an additional burden. As other authors have observed, China will have difficulty following the "Asian model" of state-guided industrial growth, given its heavy and particularistic concern for firms in trouble -a tendency to support losers rather than winners (Moore 2002; Steinfeld 2004) . 66 Stovepiping and bureaucratic rivalries in the state-owned industry makes getting from the researchers and the R&D facilities to design and subsequent production particularly problematic. As per the contribution of foreign investment, two years is obviously too short a period to assess an investment as complex as the one that Embraer has embarked in China.
Without any guarantees for minimum orders, Embraer was confident that, with the right business sense, a product with the appropriate characteristics would easily find a place in the market. Nonetheless, the number of deals so far has failed to live up to the Brazilians' expectations, There is a suspicion that China is leveraging big buying and gate-keeping its economy to promote AVIC. AIG and GE, which want to expand their financial services business ever deeper into China, run huge aircraft leasing subsidiaries, ILFC and GECAS. Government may quietly pressure them to acquire ARJ21s in exchange to opening market gates to the mother firms.
This being said, HEAI's prospects are necessarily intertwined with those of Chinese aerospace more generally. In the market for regional jets, the current competitive position of Embraer is stronger position than McDonnell's one when it cooperated with the Chinese. 67 At the same time, it is difficult to foresee the Sino-Brazilian joint venture to succeed if other, state-owned firms fail in their current plans and authorities may be tempted to push the ARJ21 project ahead of HAEI.
There is no doubt that the emergence of China's aircraft manufacturing would dramatically reshape global aerospace. However, it will take clear strategic thinking, determination, commitment and lots of money before the aerospace industry may eventually achieve credibility for more and more aircraft parts and even larger aircraft to be built in China. As this paper has shown, the industry is not immune from the various problems that plague high-end manufacturing in China -in particular, regulatory 66 For a different approach, see Lau et al. (2000) . 67 In a promising development for Embraer, in early 2004 authorities refused Air China the authorization to use 180-seat aircraft to compete with Sichuan Airlines on the Chongqing-Chengdu 300-km route. "Leis ameaçam sucesso da Embraer na China", Folha de S. Paulo, 12 July 2004. 27 inconsistency and opacity that push managers into pursuing short-term returns and excessive diversification rather than developing strong corporate competencies and building inter-firm relationship. 
